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Dreams of a simpler future: Exploring the relationship between technological 
attitudes and general happiness 
 
While Heidegger was asking questions concerning technology in 1949, he could 
not have foreseen the level of technological development nor the pace of change 
that the world has witnessed in the 57 years which have passed since then. Only 
34 years ago, Alvin Toffler's Future Shock was examining the impact of up-and-
coming technologies. He stated "future shock [is] the shattering stress and 
disorientation that we induce in individuals by subjecting them to too much 
change in too short a time" (1970). That sense of shock is one that is often 
forgotten in the technological debate, where the question asked is more often 'how' 
than 'why'.  
 
This paper begins by looking at public opinion around the issue of technology and 
scientific advance, and correlating that opinion to other lifestyle variables such as 
measures of happiness and religiosity. It then continues to examine the impact of 
technology on society from a cultural perspective, looking at the broader issues of 
technological change at a social systemic level, and finally it considers current  
public opinion data in light of the systemic change issues. Overall the thrust of the 
paper is to look at some of the social implications of technology rather than 
technology in itself, specifically in relation to the new media technologies. 
 
Empirical Data 
EVS 
We begin by looking at some empirical data about people's reactions to 
technology in general. The European Values Study is a pan-European project 
which utilises an omnibus survey focusing especially on values associated with 
work, religion, lifestyles and other issues. Its most recent data gathering exercise 
was in 1999/2000, the third of its kind and the first EVS to include former soviet-
bloc countries. The previous surveys were held in 1981 and 1990. Included in the 
questionnaire in all three surveys were a number of items related to technology, 
simplicity of lifestyle and scientific advances.  
 
The first slide shows the Irish responses to the general desirability of more 
emphasis on the development of technology over the three surveys. Generally 
speaking the data suggest a rise in the number of people seeing more emphasis on 
the development of technology as 'a good thing' (62.5% to 69.6%), a 
corresponding diminution in those seeing it as 'a bad thing' (15% to 9.2%), and a 
fairly static percentage of around 20% for those who 'don't mind' one way or the 
other. 
 
In the next slide, we see the corresponding percentage of responses data for the 
same general question, but this time the specific focus is on the desirability of a 
simple or more natural lifestyle. Here we see a decrease in the number of people 
seeing such a focus as 'a good thing' (87.2% down to 83.6%) and a corresponding 
scale of rise in the number choosing 'don't mind' as a response (9.9% to 14.5%). 
The overall variation in the numbers seeing a simple or more natural lifestyle as 'a 
bad thing is in the region of 1% over 20 years. 
 
The third  of these slides shows the responses to a question as to whether scientific 
advances are deemed helpful or harmful to mankind. Here there is little change in 
the numbers of people seeing such advances as helpful (41.1% to 39.7%) but there 
are significant changes in the other two categories. The number of people stating 
that scientific advances 'will harm' mankind drops (29.9% to 17.4%) with a 
corresponding rise to the more nuanced response of 'some of each' (29% to 
42.8%). 
 
If we turn to the wider constituency of the other nations included in the 1999/2000 
EVS data, we get a broader picture. Looking first at the issue of more emphasis on 
the development of technology, we see in slide 4 the aggregated responses for 
each nation. Generally speaking, nations from the former soviet-bloc countries 
seem to be more in favour of such an emphasis than those in the European Union. 
It is interesting to note that the Irish figures are very similar to those of the overall 
average of all nations together. Sweden, Denmark, Greece and the Netherlands 
have the levels of respondents seeing such emphasis as 'a bad thing', in excess of 
25% in each country. Sweden, N. Ireland, Spain, Germany and the Netherlands 
each have in excess of 25% 'don't mind'. 
 
In slide 5 we see similar data for the various countries based on the response to the 
question regarding 'a simple and more natural lifestyle'. Russia stands out as the 
only country with less than 60% choosing 'a good thing' by way of response. 
Russia, Ukraine, Germany and the Netherlands all have more than 10% of 
respondents opting for 'a bad thing'. The numbers selecting 'don't mind' range from 
22.1% (Russia) to 9.2% (Luxembourg). The Irish figures are broadly in line with 
the overall average, with a slight difference in the 'don't mind' category  
 
Slide 6 shows similar international data for responses to the question as to whether 
scientific advances will help or harm mankind. 'Will help' ranges from 66.3% to 
30.7%, 'will harm' from 8.7% to 18.4%, and 'some of each' from 25% to 60.7%. It 
is interesting to note that there is a very strong indirect linear relationship between 
'will help' and 'some of each'. Ireland once again is very close to the international 
average point. 
 
Crosstabulation analyses on the variables indicated weak but statistically 
significant relationships. Reliability analyses yielded non-significant results, 
indicating that each of these variables is measuring a different phenomenon.  
 
So much for empirical data. But what exactly do these figures tell us? Essentially, 
the overall thrust of these figures is straightforward: there are considerable 
differences within and between countries on the desirability of emphases on 
technology and simplicity of lifestyle, and the overall effect of scientific advances. 
The picture is not by any means black-and-white. People are nuanced in their 
responses, particularly in relation to the issue of scientific advances. The question 
of the desirability of a simple and natural lifestyle is more marked across nations 
than it is within. Generally speaking, such a lifestyle is deemed desirable by a 
majority is every country but almost 20% in Russia deem that changing to such a 
lifestyle in the future to be 'a bad thing'.    
 
Happiness and Belief in God 
It may be useful, therefore, to turn again to the EVS data, in a view to looking at 
some further data on a wider number of phenomena.  As I indicated in the opening 
of this paper, the EVS contains many variables related to lifestyle and religion 
amongst other things.  
If we look at the responses to the question about happiness, we see the data in 
slide 7. It is important to bear in mind that the lower the mean score, the higher the 
level of happiness. Here we see that there is a distinct break between eastern and 
western nations in Europe, with the western nations indicating higher levels of 
mean happiness that the eastern nations.  
 
Running a one-way ANOVA on mean happiness with the attitudes to technology 
as factors yields a significant result (F=55.27, p<.001). The descriptive data are 
given along with the Bonferroni data in slide 8. The data indicate that those who 
see an emphasis on development of technology as good are least happy and those 
who see such development as bad are the most happy. 
  
A similar one-way ANOVA test on mean happiness with the attitudes to a simple 
and natural lifestyle as factors also yields a significant result (F=29.34, p<.001). 
The descriptive data are given along with the Bonferroni data in slide 9. The data 
indicate that those who see an emphasis on a simple and natural lifestyle  as 
‘good’ or ‘don’t mind’ are happier than those who see such an emphasis as ‘bad’. 
 
A further one-way ANOVA test on mean happiness with the attitudes to scientific 
advances as factors also yields a significant result (F=13.10, p<.001). The 
descriptive data are given along with the Bonferroni data in slide 10. The data 
indicate all three groups are different on the happiness scale, those who see 
scientific advances as helpful the happiest, and those who see scientific advances 
as simultaneously harmful and helpful as the unhappiest. 
 
Running the same set of tests on mean responses to the ‘importance of God in 
one’s life’ yields some interesting results. The outcome for an ANOVA on 
importance of God with attitudes to emphasis on the development of technology 
was non-significant, i.e. there were no statistically significant differences between 
the groups. Running ANOVA for importance of God with attitudes to simple and 
natural lifestyle (F=259, p.<000) and scientific advances (F=32.66, p.<000) yields 
the results seen in tables 11 and 12. Those with the highest mean sense of God as 
important in their lives see a simple and natural lifestyle as ‘good’ and scientific 
advances as ‘harmful’, whereas those with the lowest mean sense of God as 
important in their lives ‘don’t mind’ about a simple and natural lifestyle but 
believe that scientific advances will ‘help mankind’. 
 
These various analyses of variance are simply a statistical way of looking at 
groups – in our case groups determined on the basis of their attitudes to 
technology, simplicity of lifestyle, and scientific advances – and seeing where they 
stand in relation to other variables such as happiness, and importance of God in 
their lives. While it is important not to derive simplistic conclusions from the 
statistical analyses, it is clear that the broad trends indicate significant differences 
between the groupings on the variables measured. But these trends mask 
underlying complexities. Further analysis, outside of the scope of this paper, 
should usefully focus on gender and age, as well as individual countries and 
varying GNP.  
 
Slides on contemporary attitudes (EB) follow. 
 
The impact of technology 
Survey questions, however, are a blunt tool at best for examining such critical 
topics in society, especially where there is such a variation in responses. To 
suggest that the various attitudes to technology can effectively be garnered along 
three axes – good, bad and don’t mind – may be utilitarian and economic but it 
does little to advance a deeper understanding of the underlying systemic issues. To 
focus on partial specifics can result in a failure to direct attention to critical 
dimensions of the whole. 
 
Neil Postman argues this well in his critique of technology in contemporary 
society , Technopoly. He points out that   
technological change is neither additive nor subtractive. It is ecological … One 
significant change generates total change. If you remove the caterpillars from a 
given habitat, you are not left with the same environment minus caterpillars: you 
have a new environment and you have reconstituted the conditions of survival … 
(1993, p. 18). 
 
New technologies have had considerable impact on social and cultural life. The 
influence of printing, the discovery and application of electricity, the development 
of mass transport, the invention of birth control drugs, the patenting of gene 
technologies, and the implementation of new media in society all have profound 
and far-reaching effects. When new technologies are implemented, they take time 
before they are fully adopted, but at the outset, the impact of adoption is not fully 
realised. It is only when a technology is fully embedded in society that its impact 
begins to become clearer, but by then there is no mechanism for getting the genie 
back into the bottle. As Postman puts it  
New technologies alter the structure of our interests, the things we think about 
(Postman’s emphasis). They alter the character off our symbols: the things we 
think with. And they alter the nature of community: the arena in which thoughts 
develop (1993, p. 20). 
 
Postman certainly has a case to make, and his book is a well crafted response to 
the issue of technological domination in society today. But he overstates the case. 
The same problem arises with Bernard Cohen’s famous comment on the mass 
media, that while they may not be successful in telling of what to think, but they 
are stunningly successful in telling us what to think about (Cohen, 1969). This is 
the agenda setting hypothesis that enjoys high currency in communications studies 
courses and one that does have strong empirical support.  It does, however, suffer 
from the same flaw as Postman’s ‘technopoly’ hypothesis in that it fails to take the 
end user into account.  
 
The Role of Common Sense 
 
We wring our hands, for example, at the crass excesses of the tabloid newspapers, 
but we also know that most readers are well capable of reading between the lines 
and are not as gullible as many would have us believe. People tend to exercise 
common sense about issues in their lives and are not simply slaves to cultural 
change. This is in direct contradiction to the kind of image presented to us by cult 
films like The Matrix and its sequels. The same is true of issues and concerns 
related to technological uptake. Most parents, for example, are concerned about 
the amount of time their children spent in front of television rather than studying 
their schoolbooks or engaging in sport and seek to limit the one in favour of the 
others.  
 
We need to recognise the difference between hype and substance, especially in 
terms of selective media reporting on aspects of technology. The frenzied 
reportage about the dangers of the internet to children fails to take into account the 
role of adult supervision and the inherent unlikelihood of stumbling across child 
pornography. Interestingly enough, we do not experience the same frenzy about 
children being killed on our roads, or children dying of malnutrition across the 
world, or children being exiled to permanent poverty because of inequalities in 
education, although the numbers involved in these latter three categories vastly 
outweigh the number of children in danger from the internet. Most people, 
thankfully, have the wisdom and experience to make such distinctions and are 
active users rather than passive recipients. 
 
Nonetheless, despite these reservations about Postman’s emphasis he does have a 
valid point to make. Technology is all pervasive and ongoing, scientific advances 
continue to open new Pandora’s boxes on a regular basis, and the possibility of 
retreating to a more natural and simple lifestyle is increasingly remote, except 
paradoxically for those who can afford to do it, often with the assistance of the 
latest technological wizardry. His central thesis is that we are collectively unaware 
of what is happening. Who or what shall be our guide? Postman’s argument is 
essentially about the blind leading the blind, all caught up in a technological 
euphoria that does not allow for the drawing of breath nor pausing for thought.  
 
It is precisely this failure to think critically about the issues raised by technological 
change that constitutes his primary cause for concern. Todd Gitlin, writing on the 
power of media in the 21
st
 century, puts it succinctly 
I propose that we stop – and imagine the whole phenomenon freshly, taking the 
media seriously, not as a cornucopia of wondrous gadgets or a collection of social 
problems, but as a central condition of an entire way of life. Perhaps if we step 
away from the ripples of the moment, the week or the season, and contemplate the 
torrent in its entirety, we will know what we want to do about besides change 
channels (2002, p.210). 
 
This concern is shared by theorists like Paul Virilio, who argues for an 
apocalypse-termination following a journey along a chronological axis as the 
inevitable outcome of technological development (1997). Part of Virilio’s thesis is 
that any new technology is always self-poisoned at its inception, containing 
inevitably the seed and source of its own destruction, such as development of 
dynamite leading to the bomb or of the train to the train crash; there cannot be one 
without the other.  Similarly, critical theorist Helena Sheehan comes to the 
conclusion that ‘our technology has outstripped our wisdom’ (1987, p. 66) in the 
context of television content being driven by technological capability rather than a 
desire to communicate or tell a story. These are in stark contrast to earlier theorists 
like Marshall McLuhan (1964) who saw only the positive benefits to be provided 
by new communications media in developing a global village. 
 
Conclusion 
 
What we face here, then, is a deeply polarised view of technology, one which sees 
it as a destructive anti-social force which is inevitably damaging, and the other 
that sees technology as essentially benign, a boon to the world despite whatever 
the collateral damage along the way might be. Both are ultimately fatalistic, 
accepting that technology and its concomitant forces of ongoing change are here 
to stay, and we can do little to alter that.  
 
The EVS data, on the other hand, do not support such theses at first glance. If the 
forces of technology are as irresistibly powerful as some seem to think, the 
evidence for a single common mindset about technological development and 
scientific advancement across Europe does not exist. Opinions about technology 
and science would appear to be quite varied and never monolithic. While there are 
modest associations between levels of happiness and religiosity with attitudes to 
science and technology, the modest nature of such associations, taken in tandem 
with the size of the dataset under consideration, does not allow us to draw neat 
conclusions about a relationship between the one and the other. 
 
In reality, people will continue to adopt new technologies and they will also 
adapt to the effects of emerging technologies in society. Most theorists fail utterly 
to take audiences and end users into account. Despite the nay-sayers, from the 
Luddites onward, history shows us that society continues to grow and thrive. The 
real challenge to us in the face of new and emerging technologies is one that has 
been with us since the dawn of time: how can we, in fact, make this world a better 
place to live for all the people of the planet? The real risk to us  is not technology; 
it is, rather, the possibility that some would allow themselves to so cocooned and 
insulated from reality that they would not see the plight of those on the other side. 
The Dives and Lazarus of our time are separated by more than fine linen and good 
food.  
 
The greatest challenge to society today is simply to think. Many of our endeavours 
are geared towards various ends, sometimes with little reflection. We can readily 
behave like lemmings, following on the example of others for no reason other than 
the behaviour of the other. Habermas’s public sphere (1962, 1991, 1996), arguing 
for constructive open debate about the core issues by all the members of society, 
remains something of a dream. Technological comfort can breed ignorance as to 
the plight of how the other half actually lives. Despite the shrinking of our world 
by means of technology, we have forged a whole series of individual little worlds, 
rather than a single open communicating world of equals, a globe of villages 
rather than a global village. Insofar as technology directs us towards an unthinking 
acceptance of the status quo, society must be both vigilant and resistant.  
 
An unthinking acceptance of technological change and development (and equally 
an unthinking rejection of such change and development) does not necessarily 
move us along as a society. Rather than being beguiled by the detail of the smaller 
picture we need, individually and collectively, to look at the larger canvas. As 
people we need to dream the dream of what society can be, not in terms of its 
technological perfection, but in terms of human freedom and fulfilment. Insofar as 
technology brings us toward that end, it should be embraced. Insofar as it does it 
does not, we need to ensure that our embrace of technology is not such as would 
exclude us from pursuing the core goals of freedom and possibility. 
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